Dejton @20: Vrijeme za proces opsežnih reformi

Piše: R. Bruce Hitchner

Nema razloga zašto sve strane u BiH ne mogu da sjednu – dok rade na sadašnjem planu reformi – i počnu da definiraju i pregovaraju o nizu političkih reformi koje će omogućiti i usaglasiti implementaciju i izvršenje sadašnjeg socio-ekonomskog plana reformi, posebno između države i entiteta. Fokus takvih diskusija ne smije se bazirati na ideološko jalovoj debati na tome da li državne institucije treba da imaju minimalnu ulogu a entiteti jaču ili suprotno, nego na tome šta je najfunkcionalnije i šta najadekvatnije ustavnoj podjeli odgovornosti.

Prosječan građanin koji se potrudi da pročita dokument o reformskoj agendi u BiH koji su potpisali svi nivoi vlasti u BiH ne može a da ne primijeti nekoliko veoma očiglednih stvari. Prvo, to se ne čita kao dokument koji je formulirao iko u vlasti BiH na bilo kom nivou (što je uglavnom tačno); drugo, on sadrži dugačku listu strogih socio-ekonomskih i drugih reformi koje su vjerovatno politički veoma nepopularne; i treće, izgleda da uzima zdravo za gotovo da će nakon donošenja reformskih zakona i drugih mjera da bi se popravilo ono što muči BiH uslijediti njihova puna implementacija i izvršenje, što je naravno bitno za njihov uspjeh.

VLADA-FBIH

Ako razgovarate sa onima koji su uključeni u ovu aktivnost kazaće vam – u nekim slučajevima s velikom ozbiljnošću, u drugim s rezigniranim prihvatanjerm – da je ovo prvi neophodan korak i da se mora učiniti prije nego što se pokrene ijedna od težih političkih reformi. Kažu da je ovo proces gradnje povjerenja, koji će pokrenuti važnije ekonomske probleme s kojima se suočava BiH.

Ali ne treba zaboraviti nesretnu istoriju prošlih reformskih inicijativa. Skoro sve su propale jer im je nedostajao podržan konsenzus u cijelom etnički određenom političkom spektru. I već ima znakova, uprkos nizu potpisnika na sadašnjem planu reformi, da je konsenzus slab. Jedan od razloga za to, još jednom, jeste da je reformska inicijativa pokrenuta spolja, uglavnom ovog puta od strane EU, MMF i Svjetske banke. Ali to je zato što nema političkog dogovora unutar BiH o tome kako zemlja treba da bude definirana i kako da se u njoj vlada. Uistinu, većina pitanja koja ulaze u reformski plan – rad, poslovna konkuretnost, takse, finansije, penzije, troškovi zdravstvene zaštite, reforma javne administracije i korupcija – su ona koja implicitno ako ne eksplicitno pretpostavljaju da BiH ima funkcionalnu strukturu vlade koja je potpuno sposobna da racionalno i efikasno vodi politiku i zakonodavstvo koji se za to traže. Ovo nedvojbeno nije tako veselo previđeno i odbačeno sa argumentum da će vlasti u BiH na kraju (čitaj u nadi) shvatiti da pokretanje tih pitanja treba da učvrsti vladu. To je kao kad bi vozač automobila vozeći na ispuhanim gumama nekako popravio gume dok je automobil još u pokretu.

Lako je shvatiti zašto je međunarodna zajednica, uprkos njenoj ograničenosti, poticala socijalne i ekonomske reforme kao strategiju za stabilizaciju BiH i dovođenje zemlje na put ka integraciji u EU: jednostavno nije postojala volja od strane nekih stranaka u BiH da učvrste vladu koja bi djelovala u nacionalnom interesu a niko u međunarodnoj zajednici ne želi da se suoči s ovim problemom zbog mogućeg destabilizirajućeg efekta. Bolje je rješavati reforme jednu po jednu i zaobilazno i vjerovati da će usput politički stavovi kao i političari postati odgovorniji prema nacionalnom interesu.

Ali kako je naslijeđe Dejtonskog sporazuma, potpisanog prije 20 godina, jasno pokazalo, mnoge od pažljivo artikuliranih struktura i institucija postavljenih u aneksima – a sve je pažljivo formulirala međunarodna zajednica – nisu bile dovoljne ili pogodne da se riješe problemi ili postignu pohvalni ciljevi politike koji su bili zacrtani. I onda, kao sada, neke od strana u Sporazumu bile su uveliko ambivalentne o tome kako ih sprovesti.

Ukratko, nema načina da se riješe mnogi izazovi u BiH ni kratkoročno niti srednjeročno – jedini vremenski okvir koji zaista vrijedi i za njene građane i međunarodnu zajednicu – kroz zakonodavstvo, reforme i druge odredbe koje ne dotiču te izazove u cijelosti i integralno sa spremnošću i ubjedljivošću što će odlučno i konačno prekinuti ciklus političkog nefunkcioniranja koje muči zemlju otkako je postigla nezavisnost. Upravo ovaj inkluzivni pristup svim važnim pitanjima bio je na stolu koji je dopustio neposrednim razgovorima u Dejtonu da se postigne dogovor koji je okončao rat i uspostavio BiH kao nezavisnu, jedinstvenu zemlju uprkos kasnijim nedostacima u implementaciji.

Stoga je došlo vrijeme da BiH, uz pomoć i saradnju međunarodne zajednice, inicira i pokrene reformski proces koji je istovremeno ekonomski, socijalni i politički i opsežan u cjelini. Postoji apsolutna i bezuvjetna potreba da se razmrsi način na koji se u BiH vlada a koji je iznad interesa svake pojedine grupe u zemlji ili ugađa međunarodnim sklonostima. Venecijanska komisija je ovo nedvosmisleno pojasnila još 2005. u svom Mišljenju o ustavnoj situaciji u Bosni I Hercegovini i ovlastima visokog predstavnika.

Opsežan reformski proces će zahtijevati nivo političke hrabrosti i volje kojih, kako izgleda, nedostaje ili su drukčije usmjerene među BiH vlastima i čak među članovima međunarodne zajednice. Ali upravo tu se traže kreativna, nova politička, ekonomska i diplomatska rješenja. U Dejtonu su pregovori vođeni i uspješno zaključeni zahvaljujući volji. U pregovorima oko Aprilskog paketa sve do kraja 2005, učinjen je napredak jer su sve strane odlučivale same, uz pomoć međunarodnog tima, o opsežnom nizu ustavnih i političkih pitanja na nivou države za koja su se složili da ih treba pokrenuti.

Nema razloga zašto sve strane u BiH ne mogu da sjednu – dok rade na sadašnjem planu reformi – i počnu da definiraju i pregovaraju o nizu političkih reformi koje će omogućiti i usaglasiti implementaciju i izvršenje sadašnjeg socio-ekonomskog plana reformi, posebno između države i entiteta. Fokus takvih diskusija ne smije se bazirati na ideološko jalovoj debati na tome da li državne institucije treba da imaju minimalnu ulogu a entiteti jaču ili suprotno, nego na tome šta je najfunkcionalnije i šta najadekvatnije ustavnoj podjeli odgovornosti.

U ovom pogledu međunarodna zajednica bi mogla biti od pomoći predlažući neka “pravila puta” za opsežnu reformu koja poštuje ustavnu strukturu Dejtona, a ne “bilo kakav” aranžman od strane BiH. Na primjer, dobro je i poželjno da entiteski premijeri rade zajedno na reformama, ali cijeli proces, koji se tiče zemlje u cjelini, treba da nadgleda i vodi čelnik Vijeća ministara na nivou države. Drugim riječima, međunarodna zajednica treba da očekuje od vlasti BiH da se drže ustava. Nema smanjivanja ovlasti entiteta u prihvatanju ovog principa, samo potvrda da BiH ima vladajuću strukturu koju treba poštovati kad se radi o odgovornosti.

Naposljetku, postojaće potreba za diskusijom o tome kako osigurati da sve reforme nisu jednostavno definirane i artikulirane kroz pregovore iza zatvorenih vrata između vlasti BiH i međunarodne zajednice. Sve prijedloge reformi treba da ponudi, izvede i potiče vlada na svim nivoima sa strukturalnom sposobnošću i resursima kako bi to bilo učinjeno nezavisno od direktnog međunarodnog uplitanja a da o njima rasprave i nadgledaju ih parlamenti koji imaju kapacitet za to. Ovo znači usmjeravanje i, tamo gdje je potrebno, proširenje i racionaliziranje vladinih institucija na način koji nema smisla za EU ili međunarodnu zajednicu ali ima za drušvo BiH da mora izbaciti antidemokratski, kolektivistički i etnički obojeno naslijeđe nedavne istorije. Zemlje mogu i mijenjaju svoje puteve; nema razloga da BiH ne može učiniti isto.

Preuzeto sa Dialogue-BiH2.0 – Dijalog

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By: R. Bruce Hitchner
There is no reason why all parties in BiH cannot sit down – while working on the current plan of reform – and begin to define and negotiate a series of political reforms that would allow the harmonized implementation and enforcement of the current socio-economic reform agenda, in particular between the State and the Entities. The focus of such discussions must not be based on ideological barren debate on whether government institutions should have a minimal role and entities stronger role or otherwise, but on what is the most functional and what is the most appropriate constitutional division of responsibilities.

The average citizen who takes the trouble to read the document on the reform agenda in BiH, which was signed by all levels of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot help but notice a few very obvious things. First, it is not read as a document formulated by any of the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina at any level (which is mostly true); secondly, it contains a long list of severe socio-economic and other reforms that are probably politically very unpopular; and third, it seems to take for granted that after the adoption of reform laws and other measures to repair what troubles BiH will follow their full implementation and enforcement, which is of course essential for their success.

If you talk to those who are involved in this activity, they will tell you – in some cases with great seriousness, the other with a resigned accepting – that this is the first necessary step that must be done before you start any of the more difficult political reforms. They say that this process of building trust, which will trigger major economic problems facing BiH.

But we should not forget the unfortunate history of past reform initiatives. Almost all have failed because they lacked supported consensus around the ethnically specific political spectrum. And already there are signs, in spite of a number of signatories to the current plan of reform, that consensus is weak. One reason for this, once again, is that the reform initiative launched outside, this time mainly by the EU, the IMF and the World Bank. But that is because there is no political agreement within BiH on how the country should be defined and how it should be govern. Indeed, most of the matters falling under the reform plan – work, business competitiveness, taxes, finance, retirement, health care costs, public administration reform and corruption – are those that implicitly if not explicitly presume that BiH has a functional structure of government that is fully capable of rational and effective leading the policy and legislation that is required for it. This was undoubtedly not so cheerfully overlooked and dismissed with the argument that the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the end (read: hoping) will understand that the launch of these questions needs to strengthen the government. It is as if the driver of the car driving on deflated tires somehow fixes the tire while the car is in motion.

It is easy to understand why the international community, despite its limitations, encourage social and economic reforms as a strategy for the stabilization of Bosnia and Herzegovina and bringing the country on the path to EU integration: simply there was no will by some parties in BiH to strengthen the government that would act in the national interest and nobody in the international community does not want to deal with this problem because of the potential destabilizing effect. It is better to solve the reforms one by one and work around and believe that the political views and politicians will become more accountable to the national interest.
But how the legacy of the Dayton Agreement, signed 20 years ago, was clearly showed, many of the carefully articulated structures and institutions set out in the annexes – and everything is carefully formulated by the international community – were not sufficient or suitable to solve problems or achieve commendable policy objectives which were planned. And then, like now, some of the parties in the Agreement were largely ambivalent about how to implement them.

In short, there is no way to solve many challenges in BiH neither in the short nor in the medium term – the only time frame that really applies to its citizens and the international community – through legislation, reforms and other provisions that do not address these challenges and fully integrated with the willingness and persuasiveness which will firmly and finally break the cycle of political non-functioning troubled country since the independence was achieved. Exactly this inclusive approach to all important issues were on the table that allowed direct talks in Dayton to reach an agreement that ended the war and established Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent, unified country despite the subsequent flaws in implementation.
Therefore, the time has come, with the help and cooperation of the international community to initiate and launch the reform process that is both economically, socially and politically, and comprehensive as a whole. There is an absolute and unconditional need to unravel the way in BiH is governed and which is above the interests of each group in the country or international tunes preferences. The Venice Commission is clearly explained this in 2005 in its Opinion on the constitutional situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the powers of the High Representative.

Comprehensive reform process will require a level of political courage and the will which, apparently, missing or are otherwise directed by the BiH authorities and even among members of the international community. But that is where we look for creative, new political, economic and diplomatic solutions. At Dayton, the negotiations were conducted and successfully concluded thanks to the will. In negotiations over the April package until the end of 2005, progress has been made because all parties are deciding on their own, with the help of an international team, about the extensive series of constitutional and political issues at the state level to which they agreed that they should be run.
There is no reason why all parties in BiH cannot sit down – while working on the current plan of reform – and begin to define and negotiate a series of political reforms that would allow the harmonized implementation and enforcement of the current socio-economic reform agenda, in particular between the State and the Entities. The focus of such discussions must not be based on ideological barren debate on whether government institutions should have a minimal role and entities stronger role or otherwise, but on what is the most functional and what is the most appropriate constitutional division of responsibilities.

In this regard, the international community could be of help by suggesting some “rules of the road” for comprehensive reform that respects the constitutional structure of Dayton, and not “any” arrangement by BiH. For example, it is desirable that the entity prime ministers are working together to reform, but the whole process, which regards the country as a whole, need to supervise and guide the head of the Council of Ministers on the state level. In other words, the international community should expect the BiH authorities to adhere to the constitution. No reduction in the powers of entities in the acceptance of this principle, only confirmation that BiH has a ruling structure that should be respected when it comes to accountability.
Finally, there is a need for a discussion on how to ensure that the reforms are not easily defined and articulated through negotiations behind closed doors between the BiH authorities and the international community. All reform proposals of reforms should o perform, offer and encourage governments at all levels with the structural capability and resources that should ensure that everything is done independently of direct international involvement and to debate about them and oversee them parliaments that have the capacity for it. This means guidance and, where necessary, expansion and rationalization of government institutions in a way that does not make sense for the EU and the international community but has to BiH society which should throw out anti-democratic, collectivist and ethnically colored heritage of recent history. Countries may and change their ways; there is no reason that BiH cannot do the same.
Taken from Dialogue-BiH2.0 – Dijalog

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